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KAFKASYA  
ARAŞTIRMALARI

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# OAKA

## ORTA ASYA VE KAFKASYA ARAŞTIRMALARI

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## SUNUŞ

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Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Arařtırmaları Dergisi (OAKA) olarak yedinci yılımızı da bu sayımızla birlikte geride bırakıyoruz. Bu güne kadar bölge ile ilgili İngilizce ve Türkçe olarak 100’den fazla akademik makaleyi düşün hayatına kazandıran dergimiz, sizlerin de desteęiyle her sayıda etki sahasını daha da genişletiyor. Bu sayımızda da altı makale, tartıřma platformunda yer alan iki analiz ve kitap incelemelerimizle yine karřımızdayız.

Her ne kadar 2012, Ortadoęu coęrafyasındaki geliřmelerin gerek dünya gerekse Türk kamuoyu tarafından yakından takip edildięi bir coęrafya olsa da Türk dıř politikasının ilgi alanlarının bařında gelen Kafkaslar ve Orta Asya’da da oldukça önemli geliřmeler gündeme geldi. Kafkasya özelinde Gürcistan ve Ermenistan’da yapılan seçimler bu seneye damgasını vurdu. Saakařvili dönemi bir yönüyle sona ererken Gürcistan’da seçimlerle bařa gelen Bidzina İvaniřvili önümüzdeki döneme dair Rusya ile iliřkiler ve demoratik kazanımlar açasından bir çok tartıřmayı alevlendirdi. Bu bağlamda Güner Özkan bu konuda dergimize yaptıęı deęerlendirmede özellikle Rus-Gürcü iliřkilerine dikkat çekiyor. Öte yandan dergimizde yer alan iki çalıřma ise Gürcistan’daki siyasi sistemi ele alıyor. Mitat Çelikpala, Gürcistan’ın son yirmi yılını deęerlendirdięi çalıřmasında ülkedeki demokratik dönüşümü ve Saakařvili’nin geleceęini tartıřırken Andrea Filetti mukayeseli bir yaklařım benimsiyor ve Azerbaycan ile karřılařtırdıęı Gürcistan’da rejim farklılařmasını kurumsal bir bakıř açasıyla deęerlendirerek kritik dönemlere dikkat çekiyor. Sonunda iki ülkenin karma rejimler kategorisinde incelenebileceęi konusunda bir hüküm geliřtiriyor.

Rovshan İbrahimov, “Azerbaycan Enerji Politikası: Alternatif Enerji Nakil Hatları Arayıřı” bařlıklı makalesinde Kafkaslar’a reel politik açıdan yaklařarak Azerbaycan’ın bölgede izledięi siyaseti boru hatları bağlamında irdeliyor. Azerbaycan’ın çok deęiřkenli enerji politikasının incelendięi çalıřmada Batı ile iliřkiler bağlamında Bakü’de dizayn edilen siyaset analiz ediliyor.

Kafkaslardaki geliřmelere bakıldıęında 2013 yılında Ermenistan’daki bařkanlık seçimleri, ardından Azerbaycan’daki seçimler ve sonrasında bölgedeki güvenlik parametrelerindeki deęiřkenlerin önümüzdeki süreç için önemli olacaęı belirtilebilir. Orta Asya açasından ise siyasi anlamda bir yandan demokratikleřme çabaları önem kazanırken dięer taraftan Afganistan siyaseti parametrelerde etkili bir deęiřken olarak öne çıkıyor. Bu bağlamda Orta Asya konusunda 2014 sonrası

Afganistan senaryolarının tartışıldığı Şikago’da gerçekleştirilen NATO zirvesi yakından takip edilirken bölge ülkeleri ve ABD arasında ciddi bir yakınlaşmanın başladığı gözlemlendi.

Sertif Demir ve Ali Bilgin Varlık’ın Afganistan’da Türk askerinin pozisyonunu incelediği çalışma ise Afganistan’daki gelişmelere farklı bir açıdan bakmamıza olanak sağlıyor. Makalede Afganistan’daki Türk askerinin ülkedeki başarısı ve bu başarının arka plan koşulları üzerinde durulmaktadır. Fyodor Lukyanov ise dergimiz için özel olarak hazırladığı analizde Rusya’nın Afganistan’a yaklaşımını ele alarak konuya Moskova’dan ayrı bir pencere açıyor.

Orta Asya özeline bakıldığında bir diğer önemli husus ise bölgedeki siyasi sistem ve toplumsal yapı. Bu bağlamda sivil toplumun varlığı ve son dönemde bölgede yer alan ülkelerin dönüşümüne sağladığı katkı daha da fazla dile getirilmeye başlandı. Dergimizin bu sayısında Firdous Ahmad Dar ve Mohd Younus Wani’nin, Tacikistan özelinde STK’ların Tacik kadınının gelişimindeki rolünü inceleyen çalışmasına yer veriyoruz. Makalede Tacik kadınının aile içi şiddet, eğitim, sağlık gibi konularda kendilerine yardımcı olan STK’larda alternatif bir ses bulduğu ifade edilirken, bu kuruluşların önemli bir boşluğu doldurduğu belirtiliyor.

Demokratik anlamda dönüşüm sürecinin tamamlanmadığı, hatta yer yer Sovyet dönemi otoriteryanizmini hatırlatan siyasal sistemlere sahip bölgede herkesin yakından takip ettiği ülke ise Kırgızistan. İki kez halk hareketleri ile rejimin değiştiği Kırgızistan’da demokratik dönüşümün nasıl şekil alacağı oldukça önemli. Ancak Pınar Akçalı ve Dinara Murzaeva daha farklı bir noktaya dikkat çekiyor. Dönüşümün dinamikleri arasında geçmiş ile ilgili algıların bugünü nasıl şekillendirdiği konusunda yoğunlaştıkları çalışmalarında alan çalışması üzerinden giden yazarlar Sovyet sonrası dönemdeki gelişmelerin hem Sovyet dönemine ilişkin algıyı yeniden şekillendirdiğini, hem de yeni dönemde demokrasinin gelişimi ile ilgili görece daha olumlu beklentileri ortaya çıkardığını savunuyor.

Her zamanki gibi kitap incelemeleri, analizler ve makalelerle dolu olan dergimiz senenin son sayısını sizlerin beğenisine sunuyor. Sizlerden gelen değerlendirme ve görüşleri dikkate almaya çalışan dergimizi önümüzdeki dönemde de yapacağınız katkılarla her zaman olduğu gibi daha iyiye taşımayı hedefliyoruz. Bir sonraki sayıda buluşmak dileğiyle...

**Editörler**

## WINNING PEACE: A MERE DREAM OR AN ACHIEVABLE OBJECTIVE? INFERENCES FROM THE TURKISH PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

### **BARIŞI KAZANMA: BİR HAYAL MI VEYA BAŞARILABİLİR BİR HEDEF Mİ? TÜRKİYE’NİN AFGANİSTAN’DAKİ BARIŞI KORUMA DENEYİMLERİNDEN ELDE EDİLEN SONUÇLAR**

Sertif DEMİR\* & Ali Bilgin VARLIK\*\*

#### ABSTRACT

*Turkey’s exclusive relationship with Afghanistan has led to Turkey to conduct a peculiar type of peace support operation in this country, which is quite different from the other PSOs carried out. The key theme of the article is to examine what enabled Turkish peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan to be successful. Turkey’s peacekeeping efforts have gained success in Afghanistan mainly because of “background conditions,” which are a common geography, common faith, common wishes, the legitimacy of the operation, availability of sufficient forces, respecting values of Afghans, and not carrying imperial aims. The article focuses on analyzing the background conditions, with major inferences from the Turkish peacekeeping endeavor in Afghanistan.*

**Key Words:** *Peace Support Operations, Background Conditions, Counter Insurgency, Afghanistan, ISAF*

#### ÖZET

*Afganistan ile olan münhasır ilişkisi, Türkiye’nin, uygulanan diğer barış gücü harekâtlarından farklı olarak, söz konusu ülkede kendine özgü bir barışı destekleme harekâtı icra etmesine neden olmuştur. Makalenin ana teması Afganistan’daki başarılı Türk barış çabasına nelerin etki ettiğini incelemektir. Türkiye’nin Afganistan’daki barışı koruma çabası, çoğunlukla “arka plan koşulları” olan ortak coğrafya, ortak inanç, ortak dilek, harekâtın meşruiyeti, emperyal amaç taşımama, yeterli kuvvete sahip olma ve Afgan değerlerine saygı dolayısı ile başarı kazanmıştır. Makalede Afganistan’daki Türk*

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barışı koruma çabasından elde edilen ana çıkarımlarla, arka plan koşullarının analizi üzerinde durulacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Barışı Destekleme Harekâtı, Arka Plan Koşulları, Ayaklanmalara Karşı Koyma, Afganistan, UGYK

## Introduction

Afghanistan is positioned at the center of all major powers, including Russia, China, India, and Pakistan, and is the venue where energy resources in the Caspian Basin and Central Asia can be monitored or controlled.<sup>1</sup> The U.S. has mainly intervened in Afghanistan to prevent extremism, balance China and Russia, control energy corridor routes, and encircle Iran from the East. However, the extended war has incurred unexpected damage both in material and moral terms for the U.S. The prolonged war has exhausted U.S. resources and caused casualties. Counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan have cost 455.4 billion dollars as of the end of 2011,<sup>2</sup> a figure likely to increase to more than 550 billion dollars at the end of 2012. Additionally, as of November 2012, U.S. military fatalities have reached 2,154<sup>3</sup> and the number of wounded 17,674.<sup>4</sup> The failure in Afghanistan has also lessened the United States' credibility and caused its hegemonic power to decline. Heavy losses and casualties have brought a policy change which focuses on the development of self-sustainable and capable Afghan security forces planned to take responsibility for security at the end of 2014.

The prolonged Afghanistan war also has negative implications for NATO, which for the first time initiated an operation outside the Euro-Atlantic area starting in 2003 in the Kabul area, and assumed full operational responsibility throughout Afghanistan in 2006. NATO became involved for the first time in “kinetic” operations, or counter-insurgency and ground combat. The Afghan mission has come to be seen as the test case of the alliance's credibility.<sup>5</sup>

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1 Library of Congress–Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Afghanistan, August 2008, (<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Afghanistan.pdf>), p. 2. See also J. A. Norris, *The First Afghan War 1828-1842*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 15.

2 “Estimated War-Related Costs, Iraq and Afghanistan”, *Infoplease*, (<http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0933935.html>).

3 “Coalition Military Fatalities By Year”, *icasualties*, (<http://icasualties.org/oef/>).

4 “Operation Enduring Freedom: U.S. Wounded Totals”, *icasualties*, (<http://icasualties.org/OEF/USCasualtiesByState.aspx>).

5 Mark Webber, “NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan”, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2009, p. 55.

The war in Afghanistan is still a very hot topic among academics and entices public attention. The U.S., NATO, and other allies have also deeply focused on searching for the right policy to be implemented in Afghanistan. NATO and the allies' policy implementations to counter the Taliban insurgency and discover what strategies work are still in progress. The increasing casualties have likewise led to a public debate among Americans regarding U.S. strategy and whether the right course of action is being implemented.

Turkey's relations with Afghanistan have historical roots, and therefore Turkey contributed to the PSO led by the United States after the overthrow of the Taliban regime. The Turkish contribution to the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) is highly appreciable and presents a unique characteristic in concept, background conditions, and outcomes.

The article examines what enables the Turkish peacekeeping effort in Afghanistan to be a successful case. It focuses on the background conditions of the successful Turkish peacekeeping operation and the inferences from the Turkish experiments in Afghanistan.

It will be worth focusing on analyzing and exploring this PSO, as there is not adequate academic debate over it. As a partner in the ISAF coalition, Turkey's assistance to stability in Afghanistan is a unique example and therefore needs to be illuminated. Studying the factors and mottos affecting the Turkish peacekeeping endeavors in Afghanistan will assist in conceptualizing the background conditions of similar types of peace support operations on an academic level. This is likely to enhance further academic studies on identical peacekeeping efforts.

The first part of the study covers a detailed theoretical aspect of peace support operations. The second part outlines the development in Afghanistan after 9/11, which covers the deposing of the Taliban from power and the nation building efforts of the U.S. and allied forces while conducting COIN operations against the insurgency. In the third section, Turkey's involvement in the Afghanistan operation will be examined in detail. The fourth part covers the analysis of the background conditions of success in Turkish efforts at peace support in Afghanistan. The focus will be on identifying the factors behind the Turkish success in Afghanistan, especially historically-rooted common dominators, which are the common geography, the common "destiny," and the common wishes of Turkey and Afghanistan, the essential factors in Turkish accomplishments. The inferences from the Turkish experiments will also be studied in this section. The article will be finalized with a conclusion that elucidates all results achieved.

PSOs present different characteristics from conventional military warfare with respect to implementation and gauging the success of operation outcomes. Peace operations are difficult to carry out and offer unique characteristics.<sup>6</sup> For example, the enemy is obviously identifiable, the tasks and objectives are quite differentiated. A PSO commonly includes political, diplomatic, military, and humanitarian efforts. The background conditions, such as historical ties and cultural bonds with the subject country which can facilitate the execution of an operation, are also essential elements for the success of peacekeeping operations. However, a PSO assessment is mostly challenging and normally based on the biased evaluating. Therefore, gauging or assessing Turkish success in the PSO in Afghanistan has some delimitations, because there are not adequate concrete inputs to do so. Furthermore, Turkey has caveats regarding the deployment of Turkish troops in counter-terrorism, which can provide more useful inputs for measuring success. So the measuring of success could only be done through subjective elements such as the observations of Afghans' behavior toward Turkish soldiers, number of attacks on Turkish troops, in-depth interviews with Afghans, degree of free movement of Turkish troops in Kabul, and Turkish military and civilian contribution to the country. All in all, the Turkish commitment to Afghanistan is a peculiar type of operation aimed at establishing a safe and secure environment, mostly with soft power elements. This leads to hardship in gauging the success of the Turkish peacekeeping endeavor in Afghanistan.

### **A Synopsis of Peace Support Operations**

Generally, “peace operations” are the military operations other than war (MO-OTW) that are designed to support political and diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. The term PSO describes organized international assistance initiatives to support the maintenance, monitoring, and building of peace and the prevention of resurgent violent conflicts. A crisis response or PSO will therefore generally include political, diplomatic, military, and humanitarian efforts to control any conflict and to promote reconciliation, re-establishment of an effective government and a self-sustaining peace.<sup>7</sup> PSOs are continually developed within the context of crisis response operations and designed to tackle the complex emergencies and robust challenges posed by collapsed or collapsing

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6 Stephen A. Shambachu, “Force XXI and Peace Operations”, *U.S. Army War College*, Carlisle Barracks, 1996, p. 6.

7 Gerald W. Norbut, *Non-Lethal Weapons: Force Enabler for the Operational Commander Conducting Peace Operations*, 5 February 2001, Naval War College, USA.

states in an uncertain and evolving strategic environment.<sup>8</sup> Peace operations have been in use in international affairs since the establishment of the U.N. in 1945.

Since the inception of United Nations Peacekeeping missions, three core principles have guided the operations of all missions. They are: consent of the parties to the presence of peacekeepers, impartiality in implementation of the peacekeeping mandate, and a very restricted use of force.<sup>9</sup> The aim of the Cold War model of peacekeeping requiring a mandate by the U.N. Security Council and the consent of the warring parties was to supervise cease-fires on the principles of complete impartiality and of restricting the use of force in self-defense. So the U.N. Peacekeeping Principles focus on security, rule of law, political processes, and coordination.<sup>10</sup> For some time, the use of force was limited to self-defense. The latter principle has since evolved to encompass not only self-defense, but defense of civilian non-combatants and enforcement (defense) of U.N. mandates.<sup>11</sup> The term “robust PSO” was created to reflect the differentiation between the old and new PSO concepts.

The post-Cold War world has witnessed a sharp increase in the number of international operations. In dealing with the increase of intra-state and ethnically motivated conflicts after the collapse of the bipolar system, the international actors soon had to learn that traditional concepts of peacekeeping were no longer applicable as the nature of conflict had changed.<sup>12</sup> As cease-fires or peace agreements did not bring an end to violence, a more comprehensive approach to peace was needed. By the involvement of various highly violent armed groups, genocide and ethnic cleansing caused a high number of civilian victims. Therefore, The Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 can be considered the turning point in the shift from traditional peacekeeping efforts to robust peace operations (to peace-enforcement): The agreement led to the UNPROFOR mission being replaced by the multinational military implementation force IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>13</sup>

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8 NATO Education and Training for Peace Support Operations, *ATrainP-1(A)*, August 2010, p. 1.

9 William Flavin, “US Doctrine for Peace Operations”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, No. 1, February 2008, p. 38.

10 *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, New York, 2008, p. 31, cited by Ian Johnstone, “Managing Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations”, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 2011, p. 23.

11 Robert Swope, *The Reform of United Nations Peace Support Operations in the New Millennium*, United States Peace Support Operation Training Center, 28 August 2011.

12 Peter Lang, “Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspective”, *Center for International Studies (CIS)*, Zurich, p. 23.

13 *Ibid.*

The main characteristic of the new generation of PSOs is that they can be carried out by armed forces even without the consent of the warring parties in order to enforce peace and restore international security. While traditional peacekeeping is based on Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, which encourages nations to settle disputes peacefully, the latter PSO mandates are usually based on Chapter VII, which also allows the use<sup>14</sup> of armed forces to restore peace. While traditional peacekeeping is strictly limited to the use of force in self-defense, robust peacekeeping mandates authorize the mission to “use all means necessary” to implement the mandate and protect the mission.<sup>15</sup>

PSOs have been differentiated as peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and peace-making (peace building, peace enforcement,<sup>16</sup> and humanitarian operations<sup>17</sup> after the 1990s). Each definition is categorized according to aim, tasks and functions, use of weapons, mandate, etc. Countering insurgency or stabilization operations are the extreme phases of peace enforcement operations in which nation building or defeating insurgents are key objectives, as in Iraq and Afghanistan. These operations require the use of armed forces against an insurgency to quell the situation.

Today’s complex PSO requires the close cooperation of all actors involved, as well as an appropriate combination of instruments, while taking into account the divergent views and different approaches to achieving a common goal.<sup>18</sup> PSOs

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14 See NATO/PfP, *Bi-MNC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations*, 16 October 1998; Ian Johnstone, “Managing Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations”, pp.168–182; and also UN assessment at (<http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/briefing/peacekeeping/peacekeeping.pdf>).

15 Lisa Hultman, “Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace Operations on Violence against Civilians”, *Civil Wars*, Vol. 12, No. 1-2, March-June 2010, p. 31.

16 Definition can be read at AJP 3.4.1, *Peace Support Operations, Military Agency for Standardization*, 2001, pp. 2-4–2-8:

Conflict Prevention: Military deployments designed to deter and coerce parties this may require a combat posture and an enforcement mandate.

Peace Enforcement: Designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate. The aim is to compel, coerce and persuade the parties to comply.

Peacekeeping: Undertaken to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement. Limited use of force to self-defense, guide the conduct of operation.

Peace Building: Includes mechanisms tend to consolidate peace, foster a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction.

Peace Making: Covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement.

17 Peter Lang, “Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspective”, p. 23.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 26.

can be highly demanding and add significant multinational and civil dimensions to military operations. This requires that all contributing forces must be trained, equipped, and supplied to accomplish tasks across the full range of PSOs.<sup>19</sup>

The end of the Cold War highlighted the necessity for managing new types of conflicts in alternative ways. Major players like the U.N., OSCE, EU, and NATO were forced to adapt to new circumstances and to reconsider their roles in conflict settlement.<sup>20</sup> In the 1990s, NATO became an important organization competing with the challenges of the new security architecture and established rules and concepts for conducting PSOs. Therefore, NATO has conceptualized today's complex missions and reflects the envisaged integrated approach involving political, military, and humanitarian action.<sup>21</sup>

Assessing the progress of any PSO is also important because the perception of progress has an effect on the sustainability of the war effort. Measuring the success of peacekeeping is hardly an achievable objective due to the unavailability and credibility of clear evaluations as well as vague situations. Those inferences might not be adequate to develop definitive judgments. In conventional warfare, identifying the momentum of battle is a fairly straightforward undertaking. The movement of the frontlines, attrition rates, industrial production of war material, and logistical sustainability of forces in the field provide fairly obvious standards by which to assess trends. But counter-insurgency and stabilization operations which can be assessed as a part of peace enforcement operations – like the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan – are different, and more complex. In those cases, winning the hearts and minds of people is sometimes the most reliable indicator rather than figures of insurgents killed or arrested indicating success in peacekeeping operations. So subjective assessments generally precede clear evaluations in these types of peace support operations.

### **Afghanistan's Historical Background**

Afghanistan has been a peaceful country; it has for centuries been a conflicted state with warrior groups. That presents a complex situation because of its geopolitical location, trans-ethnic populations, and rivalry among its neighbors.<sup>22</sup>

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19 NATO *Education and Training for Peace Support Operations*, ATrainP-1(A), August 2010, pp. 1-2.

20 Peter Lang, "Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspective", p. 21.

21 NATO/PfP *Bi-MNC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations*, 16 October 1998; NATO *Peace Support Operations*, AJP-3.4.1, 2001, p. 3-1; NATO *Non-Lethal Weapons and Future Peace Enforcement Operations*, TR-SAS-040, November 2004.

22 Nasreen Akhtar, "Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Taliban", *International Journal on World*

The Taliban came to power as a result of a combination of various developments with the dominant factor of support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Western coalition forces led by the United States overthrew the Taliban regime as the Taliban were seen as being responsible for the attack on the twin towers in New York, on September 11, 2001. The Bonn Agreement in December 2001 and the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 dated December 20, 2001 laid down the new provisional Afghanistan establishment and future transformation. An important part of the agreement and resolution was the establishment of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. This resolution and agreement gave a strong mandate to multinational forces to create a safe and secure environment in Afghanistan, using coercive measure if required. This mandate can be deemed more than an authorization for a multinational peace enforcement operation. In fact, the operation concept was enlarged to cope with and subdue the Taliban insurgency, covering the employment all military means.<sup>23</sup>

Although the Taliban were driven out of power in a very short time, they did not remain silent for long.<sup>24</sup> From the outset, the coalition forces were proud of their overthrow of the Taliban in a fast and inexpensive war based on overwhelming superiority in terms of the most modern technology, but the following developments showed the limited ability of the United States and its allies to maintain control over occupied territory.<sup>25</sup>

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*Peace*, Vol. 25, No. 4, December 2008.

23 See the followings for comprehensive background;

UN Human Development Report, Human Development Index (HDI) - 2011 ranks Afghanistan as the 172<sup>nd</sup> out of 187, ([http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR\\_2011\\_EN\\_Table1.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_EN_Table1.pdf)). Human Security Index assesses Afghanistan in the least secure group, (<http://www.humansecurityindex.org/>). The Economist, Economist Intelligence Unit, grades Afghanistan is as the 7<sup>th</sup> instable country in the world for the period of 2009-2010, ([http://viewswire.eiu.com/site\\_info.asp?info\\_name=social\\_unrest\\_table&page=noad](http://viewswire.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=social_unrest_table&page=noad)). Sertif Demir, "The War in Afghanistan Toward Which Direction? Vietnams, Soviet's Afghanistan Occupation or Iraq", *KHO Bilim Dergisi*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2010, pp. 165-194. Lawrence Ziring, "Unraveling the Afghanistan-Pakistan Riddle", *Asian Affairs*, Summer 2009. Craig Baxter, "Historical Setting: The Second Anglo-Afghan War", *A Country Study: Afghanistan*, Library of Congress-Federal Research Division, 1997, ([http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+af0013\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0013))). Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords*, (London: Pan Books, 2001), pp. 117-124. H.R. McMaster, "On Wars: Lesson to be Learned", *Survival*, L/1, February/March 2008.

24 Francisco Gutierrez Sanin & Antonio Giustozzi, "Networks and Armies: Structuring Rebellion in Colombia and Afghanistan", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 33, No. 9, 2010, p. 845.

25 Stephen Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy", *US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute*, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2002. See other

The main reason for failure can be attributed to insufficient forces and resources available for the operation at the beginning. Disregarding the winning heart and minds policy alienated Afghans and the collateral damage to civilians caused by air operations is another significant aspect explicitly accounting for setbacks in the alliance's effort in Afghanistan. Additionally the lack of a unity of effort and national caveats were indeed serious threats to the cohesiveness and credibility of the alliance.<sup>26</sup>

Moreover, ineffective government, corrupted public services, the continuation of warlords' hegemony in their respective areas, the under-funded and under-sourced public life, the failure in preventing the cultivation of opium leading to drug trade, insurgents and criminal organizations that cause instability in the country,<sup>27</sup> and the absence of a viable criminal justice system<sup>28</sup> could also account for why the U.S. and NATO fail.

Another difficulty of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is measuring the success of the operation results. Accessing concrete inputs is hardly achievable due to operational features. For example, a survey to gauge American success was realized through mostly subjective data which articulated that the success in Afghanistan is still unclear ten years later.<sup>29</sup>

The U.S. and NATO, starting from the end of 2009, have implemented a new operation plan aimed at disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates and preventing Afghanistan and Pakistan from again becoming safe havens. The ambiguities about the war's strategic goals and desired end-state were redefined. The main focus has been on degrading the capabilities of the

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references for details; James Hackett (Ed.), *The Military Balance 2009: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics*, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2009, p. 331. David Lyon, *Butcher&Bolt: Two Hundred Years of Foreign Engagement in Afghanistan*, (London: Hutchinson, 2008).

26 Tarn D. Warren, "ISAF and Afghanistan the Impact of Failure on NATO's Future", *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 59, 2010, pp. 50-51.

27 Raymond A. Millen, "Afghanistan: Reconstituting A Collapsed State", *Strategic Studies Institute*, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, April 2005, pp. 8-11; Barnett R. Rubin & Andrea Armstrong, "Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan", *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 1, Spring 2003, p. 34.

28 Seth G. Jones, "Averting Failure in Afghanistan", *Survival*, Vol. 48, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 115-116.

29 "US Measure of Success in Afghanistan Is Still Unclear 10 Years Later, *American Security Project*, 5 October 2011, (<http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2011/report-us-measure-of-success-in-afghanistan-is-still-unclear-10-years-later/>).

Taliban and preventing insurgent groups from overthrowing the government of Afghanistan, while building up the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to sustain their own security.<sup>30</sup> ISAF planned to transfer the leading role in terms of security to ANSF by the end of 2014. It is envisaged that Afghan government will have the capacity to establish and sustain a secure environment on its own. Considering all the efforts, there is no clear sign that the U.S. and NATO are winning the war on terror.

## **Turkey's Contribution to the ISAF Operation and Afghanistan**

### **Measuring Turkish Success in Afghanistan**

As expressed in the previous sections, it is quite questionable to measure the success of any kind of PSO, as the figures cited for success are normally not concrete and therefore more general. Abstract assessment could be used as a practicable solution to measure achievements. Coming to Turkish success in Afghanistan, first we need to look at what the strategic goal of Turkish participation in OEF is. Considering Turkey's caveats on force employment, its strategic goals are: assisting the Afghan government in terms of diplomatic and political efforts to build up the Afghan forces so that they can take security responsibility, and to help raising the people's standard of living. Turkish strategic goals mostly converge with the ISAF strategic goals which are: a) building up the Afghan forces and government so that they can take responsibility for their country and their country's future, b) prevent the Taliban from overthrowing the government, and c) deny al-Qaeda a safe haven.

We can gauge the Turkish accomplishment according to what Turkey has done so far and in which direction the perception of Afghans has been shaped by the Turkish contribution. In order to measure the Turkish successes in peacekeeping efforts we need to know: the number of Turkish forces that joined the OEF, security tasks achieved, amount of units or students educated or trained by Turkey, number of patients treated at Turkish military hospitals, amount of infrastructure assets Turkey provided to Afghanistan, Turkish civilian capacity presented to Afghanistan, and Turkish political capacity to help Afghanistan's international issues, etc. The following will answer and assess these points.

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30 Robert Michael Gates, "The Tragic Costs of Success-Elements of Effective Transition in Afghanistan", *Military Technology*, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2011.

## Turkish Contribution to Afghanistan

Turkey's role in the ISAF operation and its capacity could be analyzed in two areas. The first is Turkey's changing stance in the international environment, and the second is Turkey's particular performance in Afghanistan.

The end of the Cold War diversified Turkey's geopolitical importance from being the southern flank country of NATO to the key country between the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East.<sup>31</sup> For that reason after 9/11, Turkey was one of the first countries invited to the international coalition established by the Bonn Agreement for Afghanistan. Turkey's long-term experience in fighting against terrorism and the possible demand of the U.S. to use Turkey's air space and the Incirlik air base<sup>32</sup> also led Turkey to being preferred in the Afghanistan crisis.

Turkey's performance in Afghanistan should be analyzed by answering these two questions: "What has it done?" and "How has it been doing?"

Turkey's military and civilian presence has continued seamlessly since its first contribution to ISAF for the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surroundings under the lead of the United Kingdom<sup>33</sup> on February 16, 2002. Later, Turkey led ISAF in two terms in 2003 and 2005.<sup>34</sup> Additionally, Turkey assumed the task of the Senior High Civil Representative of Afghanistan for a two-year period (2004–2006). The achievements of former Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin as the Senior High Civil Representative in his tour of duty won Turkey more support from Afghanistan and world public opinion in general.<sup>35</sup>

31 Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001), pp.17-18.

32 Sevinç Alkan Özcan, "Turkish Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan: 2009-2010", *Perceptions*, Vol. 15, No. 3-4, Autumn-Winter 2010, p. 134.

33 ISAF was first established under the lead of the United Kingdom by the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386. *UNSCR, S/RES/1386 (2001)*, 20 December 2001, (<http://d,dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf?OpenElement>), p. 1

34 In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1413, Turkey first led ISAF II for the period of 20 June 2002-10 February 2003, with a battalion-sized task force composing of approximately 1,300 troops. *UNSCR, S/RES/1413 (2002)*, 23 May 2002, (<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/397/33/PDF/N0239733.pdf?OpenElement>), p. 1. For the second time Turkey led ISAF VII for the period of 13 February 2005-4 August 2005. During its command, Turkey provided the single largest contingent in ISAF, with about 1,500 troops in the force. *UNSCR, S/RES/1623 (2005)*, 13 September 2005, (<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/509/56/PDF/N0550956.pdf?OpenElement>), p. 2. During its lead Turkey ran the Kabul International Airport and the Multinational Headquarters.

35 Salih Doğan, "Turkey's Presence and Importance in Afghanistan", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 22 August 2010, (<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkey8217s-presence-and-importance-in-afghanistan-2010-08-22>).

Turkey had collectively provided security for Kabul province between the period of January 16, 2002 and October 1, 2009 together with the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, NATO's Land Component Command/Heidelberg, Canada, and the EUROCORPS with a total force contribution of around 7,000. Starting from October 1, 2009, Turkey took responsibility for the Regional Command Capital by itself with a unit of about 1,700 troops.<sup>36</sup> This date is also a milestone for the transfer and lease of security responsibility (TL-SR) to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).<sup>37</sup> TLSR is a ring-based system with the ANP covering the inner rings and ANA the outer ring.<sup>38</sup>

Turkey has provided military experts to training units such as operation mentoring and liaison teams (OMLTs), the Army Academy, the Military School, the Command and Staff College, the Kabul Military Training Center, and activities like Afghan National Police (ANP) training in the Kabul province. Starting from 2010, Turkey opened the Gazi Training Center which provides basic training for recruits. Shortly after the opening of the center, because of the quality of the training NATO and the Afghan authorities decided to graduate attendees not as soldiers but as NCOs. Additionally starting from 2009, Turkey has given company-sized units advanced one-month military training in Turkey and trains ANP personnel in Turkey.<sup>39</sup>

Turkey's military assistance to the ANSF helped the Afghans enhance their capacity to gain control and improved security in Kabul province by successfully

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36 As of 3 March 2012 Turkey has renewed her tour of duty as the Regional Command Capital for the third time, with a troop contribution of 1646 personnel being as the 8<sup>th</sup> largest troop in 50 nations coalition of ISAF. See, TAF/TGS (Turkish Armed Forces/Turkish General Staff), *PIR* (Public Information Release), 20 March 2012, cited in "TSK'dan Afganistan Açıklaması", *Hürriyet*, 20 March 2012, (<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=20167453>).

37 The term ANSF covers the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan Border Police (ABP).

38 Anthony H. Cordesman, Adam Mausner, David Kasten, *Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces*, CSIS, Washington D.C., 2009, ([http://csis.org/files/publication/090527\\_Cordesman\\_Winning%20Afgha\\_web.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/090527_Cordesman_Winning%20Afgha_web.pdf)), p. 68.

39 As of 18 Nov 2012 Turkey has trained 14347 Afghan National Army (ANA) members, both in Afghanistan and in Turkey (Around 3250 ANA members were trained in Turkey). *AF/TGS PIR op.cit.* Turkey also provides nearly 190 personnel to the NATO Afghan Training Mission (NTM-A). Training is also provided at the Mountain and Commando School (1190 personnel/12 infantry division are trained). Another major contribution, with the aim of increasing training support for ANP, starting from 28 July 2011, Turkey has begun training 1000 ANP students per year at the Police Training Center in Sivas/Turkey. Please see all this information at ([http://www.mfa.gov.tr/iv\\_european-security-and-defence-identity\\_policy\\_esdi\\_p\\_en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/iv_european-security-and-defence-identity_policy_esdi_p_en.mfa)).

furthering the TLSR process, while reducing the risks for Turkish forces finding themselves in a combat environment. The key elements of the counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy are sometimes described as “clear, hold, and build.”<sup>40</sup> Turkey recognized the fact that the “clear” process could only be sustainable if accomplished by the ANSF with the support of the Afghan nation as a whole. According to the Turkish approach, the “clear” phase although essential could not guarantee the success of the operation unless supported by the “hold” and “build” phases. Moreover the dynamics of Afghanistan clearly dictate that the “clear” phase is to be reshaped with reconciliation<sup>41</sup> initiatives for the reunification of the country.

For the mentioned reasons, Turkey has always argued that a purely military struggle is not enough to assure security and stability. So Turkish military forces in Afghanistan participate in neither kinetic operations nor counter-terrorist, counter-narcotics, and counter-mine activities, which places Turkey as a friendly force helping Afghan people in everyone’s eyes as echoed by Governor of Kabul Zabihollah Mojaaddedi in an interview. The fact that NATO forces hoisted the Turkish flag on their convoys in order to not be attacked – although this is forbidden – shows the respectability and importance of the Turkish Armed Forces in Afghanistan. The Turkish Armed Forces’ respectability results from the years of the War of Independence and the importance attributed to Afghanistan by Atatürk.<sup>42</sup> By not sending combat troops to Afghanistan, Turkey has responded positively to the new strategy for the country.

Correspondingly, Turkey’s efforts are concentrated more in the social, cultural, and economic areas such as education, health, agriculture, infrastructure, human resources development, capacity building, governance etc. rather than military activities.<sup>43</sup> Turkish-Afghan economic and trade relations have grown

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40 The objective of these elements is to clear space between the insurgents and the population; to maintain security; to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives. Anthony H. Cordesman, Adam Mausner, David Kasten, *Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces*, p. 19.

41 Reconciliation programs provide incentives for insurgents to lay down their weapons and pursue peaceful means of political engagement, further diminishing insurgent capacity. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

42 Muharrem Ekşi, “Turkey’s Increasing Role in Afghanistan”, *Journal of Global Analysis*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2010, p. 147.

43 During the period of 2002 and 2010 Turkey had completed more than 600 development assistance projects, reaching at least 7 million Afghans. In this context, 68 schools and 17 health clinics/ hospitals have been built or repaired. Turkey meets the administration costs of two clinics and two hospitals. As of 2010, more than two million Afghans have benefited from

36-fold, reaching \$264 million in 2010 while Turkish investment between 2002 and 2010 reached \$2.8 billion.<sup>44</sup> Additionally, Turkey established a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the district center of Meydan in Wardak Province in November 2006<sup>45</sup> and another PRT in Jowzjan in Shibirgan Province in July 2010.<sup>46</sup> Additionally, Turkish non-governmental organizations have been conducting several humanitarian and economic reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. On the military side, in addition to assisting the ANSF on security and training, Turkish troops display tremendous efforts in civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities such education, infrastructure, healthcare projects of small and medium size, and conducting emergency and relief operations.

The general outline of Turkey's current strategies in Afghanistan is mostly in line with its previous policies. Turkey's current strategies in Afghanistan can be summarized as follows:

Respect and acceptance: respect for the values of the people, focusing on cultural awareness, respect for the sovereignty of the host nation, mutual trust between people and the Turkish forces, and enhancing historical, cultural, and psychological commonalities.

Confidence building: Being tolerant and transparent, impartiality toward all ethnicities and factions, assistance for the transition of authority to Afghans.

Using soft power rather than hard power: being a center of attraction, determining the agenda, and winning hearts and minds.

Adherence to international law when using force: kinetic operations within the boundaries of just cause, necessity, right intentions, last resort, self-defense, proportionality, probability of success, discrimination of non-combatants and combatants, and no retaliation or punishment.

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Turkish assistance in health and education sectors. Turkey has drilled 168 water wells, providing drinking water to 520 thousand Afghani citizens. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Turkey and Afghanistan Economic and Trade Relations*, ([http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey\\_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-afghanistan.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-afghanistan.en.mfa)).

44 Ibid.

45 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Vardak İl İmar Ekibimiz Hakkında*, 8 Kasım 2006, ([http://www.mfa.gov.tr/bn\\_9--8-kasim-2006\\_vardak-il-imar-ekibimiz-hk.tr.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/bn_9--8-kasim-2006_vardak-il-imar-ekibimiz-hk.tr.mfa)).

46 Civilian and military personnel work together in the PRTs, whose task is to conduct the administrative and judiciary system; training of the Afghan Police Force and increasing their capabilities; conducting activities aimed to improve and support infrastructure, and public works and social support to raise the life quality of local population.

Assistance for normalization: assistance to security, governance, and development.

Train and thus increase the self-capability of Afghan security forces to be able to take over responsibility throughout Afghanistan.

### **Assessing the Success of the Turkish Contribution**

Turkish forces in Afghanistan have successfully conducted the military missions allocated to them. That is why the U.S. and NATO consistently insist on the continuity of the Turkish participation in Afghanistan in the Regional Command Capital. This is a concrete success of the Turkish Brigade in Kabul as peacekeeping forces.

Turkish forces also established good relations with Afghans by providing medical services, aiding poor Afghans, also celebrating Islamic holidays, respecting Afghans' traditional values, buying goods from local Afghans, etc. This warm rapport and these approaches have created mutual confidence. Turkish forces can travel and pass by in Kabul streets without being intimidated. This perception of success was seen during in-depth interviews with local and ordinary Afghans and through observations during temporary duty in Afghanistan.

At a political level, Turkey has focused on the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy to develop good relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is a crucial step to prevent aggressive strategies between the two countries in order to improve the security situation both in Afghanistan and the Federally Administrated Tributary Area (FATA) in Afghanistan. Turkey hosted trilateral meetings between the heads of state of Afghanistan and Pakistan in Istanbul in an effort to improve relations between the two countries. With the aid of Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a series of agreements to improve cooperation on a variety of issues from security to aid relief. The agreements are all part of Turkish-led efforts to build trust between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which observers say is crucial to ending the Taliban insurgency.

From the humanitarian aspect, Turkey increases the capacity of the Afghan government and people by constructing school, roads, dams, irrigation systems, etc. through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (*Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı*, or *TIKA*) and provisional reconstruction teams (PRTs).

Turkey's military, political, and humanitarian efforts combined with historical and cultural ties with Afghanistan have supported ISAF's goal to build up

the Afghan forces and government so that they can take responsibility for their country's future. All in all, Turkey is deemed successful in its peace support effort in Afghanistan based on verifiable measures, in-depth interviews, physical observations, and actual situation in the country.<sup>47</sup> However, the success of Turkish peace support endeavors required certain background conditions which will be explained in the following section.

### **Background Conditions for the Successful Turkish Peace Support Operation in Afghanistan**

Any PSO requires specific conditions and criteria before and during operation. These can cover impartiality, objectivity, respecting local values, the use of non-coercive force, legitimacy, etc. However, the background conditions for successful PSOs have rarely been debated and hardly taken into consideration so far. Turkey's peacekeeping effort in Afghanistan has unique character in concept, background conditions, and implementation. Common dominators, which consist of background conditions, between the two countries have shaped the past and current relations and paved the way for the future aspects. These factors also account for the unique qualities of the Turkish peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan. The common dominators of Turkish and Afghan history are deep and various. This could be categorized in three areas: first the common geography and history, second the common "faith," third the "common wishes."

#### **The Common Geography and History**

The Turkish presence in Afghanistan and adjacent regions goes back to the 1<sup>st</sup> century B.C. and extends to the late 14<sup>th</sup> century A.D. During this era, the two nations cultivated cultural commonalities and historical experiences nourished by the common geography. Afghan history cannot be well appreciated without considering the Turkish effect.<sup>48</sup> In other words, if we were to exclude Afghanistan from history, Turkish history could not be explained any further. Iskits, Kushans, Hephthalites, Ghaznavids, Seljuks, and Khwarazmis predominantly shaped Afghanistan's social and cultural features.

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47 Both writers of this article were stationed one year in Afghanistan in ISAF formations and headquarters. This provided an opportunity with writers to make depth interviews with Afghanistan and observation and to gain experiments.

48 Sertif Demir, "The War in Afghanistan Toward Which Direction? Vietnam, Soviet's Afghanistan Occupation or Iraq", *KHO Bilim Dergisi*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2010, p. 168.

The first known Turkic presence in the region was the Iskit (Saka) Turks (140 B.C.–130 A.D.).<sup>49</sup> Iskits were followed by the Yue-Chi<sup>50</sup> and one of the Yue-Chi subgroups Kushans.<sup>51</sup> The Kushan Empire controlled the area from the Indus Valley to the Gobi Desert and as far west as the central Iranian Plateau from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 4<sup>th</sup> century<sup>52</sup> until the rise of Sasanians' in 425 or 480 A.D.<sup>53</sup>

The Hephthalites (or White Huns or Halach) overwhelmed the Kushan and Sasanian kingdoms in the region and established the prosperous Afghanistan White Hun Hephthalite state in 480 which occupied Belh, Taharistan, Kabul, Ghazna, Zabul, and Kandahar.<sup>54</sup> Although the state was overrun by the Gök-Türks in 522, the Hephthalite people presumably did not leave the country and continued to live in Afghanistan. During the 5<sup>th</sup> and the 6<sup>th</sup> centuries, the Turks became masters of all the Hephthalite territories north of the Oxus.<sup>55</sup>

In the mid-7<sup>th</sup> century, Turkic rulers' presence continued in the north, Balkh, Bamiyan, and Kapisa, and they controlled the area as far as the Indus.<sup>56</sup>

Over the 7<sup>th</sup> through the 9<sup>th</sup> centuries, most habitants of what is now Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and their periphery con-

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49 Sally Ann Baynard, "Historical Setting", Richard F. Nyrop & Donald M. Seekins (Ed.), *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, Foreign Area Studies (Washington D.C.: The American University, 1986), p. 6. See also Sadri Maksudi, *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları (1-İskitler – Sakalar)*, 1933, p. 14.

50 Chinese named Yue-Chi (or YuEH-Chih) most probably is a Turkish originated tribe which was pushed into the Hindu Kush area by the Hsiungnu (Huns) of Central Asia, who had themselves been thwarted in their attacks on Chin by the Powerful Han Dynasty. Sally Ann Baynard, "Historical Setting", p. 7. See also, Bahattin Ögel, *Eski Orta Asya Kabileleri Hakkında Araştırmalar I, Yüceçiler*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1957), p. 261.

51 William Montgomery McGovern, *The Early Empires of Central Asia*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939), p. 248 cited in Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 299.

52 Sally Ann Baynard, "Historical Setting", p. 7.

53 Dames Mansel Longworth, *Afghanistan Textbook*, (R. S. Diwan Jamiat Rai and Dur Muhammad trns.), (Lahore: Punjab Government Press, 1911), p. 148; Arnold Charles Fletcher, *Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 31, cited in Mehmet Saray, *Afghanistan ve Türkler*, (Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 2002), p. 17.

54 Alev Keskin & Nilüfer Altın, *Geçmişten Günümüze Türk-Afgan İlişkileri*, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2009), p. 27.

55 Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 303.

56 Tytler Fraser & W. Kerr, *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Development in Central and Southern Asia*, (New York: Paragon Books, 1967), cited in Sally Ann Baynard, "Historical Setting", p. 8.

verted to the Sunni Muslim sect.<sup>57</sup> During the 9<sup>th</sup> century, Sammanids occupied most of Afghanistan and their army was mostly composed of Turkish soldiers.<sup>58</sup>

In 977, a new center of gravity emerged in the south in Ghazna under the rule of Turkic Ghaznavids. The Ghaznavid state set a milestone in history for the second time after the Hephthalites in that it showed Afghans, when united, could establish regional power. So the breakdown of the Ghaznavids was part of the familiar pattern of the breakdown of central authority because of internal fights.<sup>59</sup>

Another Turkic state run by the Seljuks put an end to Ghaznavid authority in Iran and Central Asia in 1040, and ruled the country until 1175. After the Seljuks, who were the progenitors of the Ottoman Turks, swept Anatolia the Gharids ruled Afghanistan for a short time.<sup>60</sup> Around 1,200 Khwarazm Turks from Central Asia overthrew the Gharids.<sup>61</sup>

Starting from 1220, like most of the Central Asian countries, Afghanistan experienced the Mongol invasion which lasted until the mid-14<sup>th</sup> century with the establishment of a Turkish-led state (under Tamerlane) in 1380.

Furthermore, social and cultural features like interpretation of religion, customs, feudal values, family ties, the importance of promise, respect for elders, literature, art, and philosophy also have a common background.<sup>62</sup> Additionally, since Turks or Turkic states had ruled Afghanistan periodically from the 1<sup>st</sup> century until the 13<sup>th</sup>, the Turkic presence in the country has been permanent. As a result of that, today the percent of the population with Turkic origins covers almost 12-20 % of the total population.<sup>63</sup>

### **The Common Faith and Wishes**

Starting from the end of the 9<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 10<sup>th</sup> centuries the majority of Turkic tribes left the area and moved west to Anatolia under the rule of the

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57 Sally Ann Baynard, "Historical Setting", p. 9.

58 Mehmet Saray, *Afganistan ve Türkler*, p. 17.

59 William Montgomery McGovern, *The Early Empires of Central Asia*, pp. 116-117.

60 Percy Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan*, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 2002), p. 203.

61 Sally Ann Baynard, "Historical Setting", p. 10.

62 For example, as one of the most prominent poet, theologian, Sufi mystic philosopher Mevlânâ Celaleddin-i (Balkhî) Rumi whose ancestors were Khwarezmis was born in the province of Balkh in Afghanistan in 1207, and lived most of his life under the Turkish state Seljuks where he produced his works and died in the city of Konya in Turkey in 1273.

63 Alev Keskin & Nilüfer Altun, *Geçmişten Günümüze Türk-Afğan İlişkileri*, p. 14.

Seljuk Empire. Although Turks migrated west, the Turkic presence in Afghanistan remained to affect the Afghans.

At the beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, both nations were severely subjected to the devastating impacts of the Timurid Empire's assaults causing a fragmentation of the geographic unity and sovereignty of their states. Both nations enlarged toward the west during the 16<sup>th</sup> and the 17<sup>th</sup> centuries. Ahmad Shah Durrani built up the nation and promoted the Afghan Empire to its greatest extent in the 1760s. This was the greatest Muslim empire after the Ottomans' at that time.

The political turmoil concerning the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, referred to as the "Eastern Question" which came to the stage in 1774, was the Turkish version of the "Great Game" which took place in the early 1800s in Afghanistan. The power struggle between Great Britain and Russia saw two different geographies clash.

Although Afghanistan managed to remain impartial during World War I (WWI) while the Ottoman Empire took the side of the Central Powers, both nations had to fight against the British Empire for their independence in the aftermath of the Great War. When the Afghan independence war known also as the third Anglo-Afghan war ended in 1919, the Turkish independence war (1919-1922) was at its commencing stage. The Turkish independence war was financed by limited external support, the majority of which was from Bolshevik Russia and from Afghan people's donations. This donation is an indication of the rooted mutual respect and dependency between both nations.

Afghanistan, together with Bolshevik Russia, was the first to recognize the modern Turkish Republic with the agreement signed in Moscow on March 1, 1921. The agreement covered Turkey's commitment to send teachers and military experts to Afghanistan.<sup>64</sup> The agreement underlined the first common wish of the two nations: independence and countering imperialism.

Amanullah Khan's visit to Turkey in 1928, during which the second "Afghan-Turkish Friendship and Cooperation Agreement" was signed, sets a peak in the Afghan-Turkish relationship. This visit underlines the second common wish of the two nations: modernization and development in the norms of Western values. The dramatic end of Amanullah Khan resulting from the resistance and rebellion of Afghan tribes has not only dragged Afghanistan into internal chaos, but also created unresolved problems which have not been settled yet.

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64 Zeki Sanhan, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlüğü*, Vol. 3, (Ankara: Erol Matbaası, 1986), p. 597.

After Habibullah's short but destructive occupation of the throne, Nadir Shah gained leadership (1929-1933) of the country with a unanimous consensus, which was also supported by Turkey. During the 1930s, Turkish-Afghan relations were enriched by Turkey's assistance in education, health, agriculture, and other civil areas.

Following the Muhammad Zahir Shah era (1933–1973), the country witnessed considerable development in Turkish-Afghan relations. Turkey played a key role in Afghanistan's acceptance to the League of Nations on September 27, 1934 as well as adding Afghanistan to the Saadabad Pact which was signed on July 8, 1937 between Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. One of the most notable events in 1934 was the resolution of the disputed Afghan-Iran border by the refereeing of Turkey, which all parties accepted without further argument.<sup>65</sup> Considering the fact that the southeastern border of Afghanistan which was established on the Durand Line in 1893 by the British still poses security concerns and the northern border was drawn by the dictation of Russia contrary to Afghan wishes, the western border of Afghanistan has always been stable, and Turkey's reliability can be better understood.

After WWII, Turkish-Afghan relations survived under the shadow of Russian influence. During the period of the Russian invasion (1979–1989) of Afghanistan, Turkey hosted considerable number of Afghani refugees. After the withdrawal of Russian forces from Afghanistan, the Turkish Embassy was the only one that remained open in Kabul for a while.

As a result, Turkey and Afghanistan's common wishes and faith have evolved through a common history and culture, mutual respect and understanding as well as similar hopes toward future prospects.

### **Other Factors Related to Background Conditions for Success in Afghanistan**

**Legitimacy:** It requires a U.N. decision and mandate to conduct PSOs in any country with legal framework. Turkey emphasizes this principle while participating in peacekeeping operations. Coming to the Afghanistan issue, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 dated December 20, 2001 laid down a clear mandate to establish ISAF. Therefore, Turkey joined the multinational peace forces from the beginning. Legitimacy also covers the consent of the Afghanistan government to accept the stationing of external forces on its land.

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65 İbrahim Etem Tiryakioğlu, "Uzaktaki Dost ve Kardeş Ülke Afganistan", *Stratejik Etütler Bülteni*, No. 96, January 1980, p. 111.

Knowledge of regional and local values: Turkey has always respected the Afghans' traditional and cultural values. When the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, the Turkish Embassy was the only one that remained open for a while. This indicates that the people of Turkey and Afghanistan have strong bonds connecting each other without considering the ideology of the governmental powers.

Not having an imperial motive: Turkey has never carried an imperial intention in its relationship with Afghanistan. This is one of the main factors creating mutual respect and confidence between the two nations and paves the way for Turkish success.

Availability of sufficient forces: Without sufficient force and material resources, no PSO, especially peace enforcement operations, can be successful. The force allocation should be at a level that meets operation objective. Turkey provided an adequate force in Afghanistan in accordance with the mission allocated to it and in the context of its caveat. So Turkey's force capacity is enough to be successful in building up security in the capital area. For example, though both operations are not identical, the U.S. operation in Iraq failed at the beginning as there were not enough forces allocated to achieve operation objectives that aimed at controlling all of Iraq. The key point here is that force projection should encompass operation aims and objectives. The U.S. force strength at the outset was insufficient to meet operational objectives.

### **Comparing the Turkish Success in OEF in Afghanistan with the U.S. Operation Iraqi Freedom**

The U.S. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003 can be seen as an example of a failed peace enforcement operation. The main reasons for failure resulted from insufficient background conditions. This operation was conducted without acquiring a U.N. mandate and had no grounds for international legitimacy. Additionally, the U.S. initiated the operation without the consent of the Iraqi government. The U.S. had no common geography, history, faith, or wish with Iraq and its people. The U.S. forces had little or no knowledge about Iraq, Islam and its sects in the region, or the values and culture of the region. America mainly intervened in Iraq due to energy resources and transportation corridors, which can be deemed as imperial objectives. Finally, the U.S. provided insufficient force to Iraq at the beginning because of miscalculation and wrong assessments. Unilaterally-conducted peace enforcements require a robust as possible force projection.

Considering all these factors, it can be emphasized that without concrete background conditions it is quite difficult to conduct a successful PSO as was seen in Iraq. Although the U.S. deposed Saddam Hussein and the Baath regime, it resulted in 4,487 dead and 32,223 wounded U.S. soldiers.<sup>66</sup> It also cost \$3 trillion in material.<sup>67</sup> The U.S. public image has deteriorated, its world supremacy has declined, and Iraq has fallen to the Shia sect and Iran. So in order to understand the Turkish success in Afghanistan, Table 1 was drawn for comparison. Turkey seems more successful in the context of background conditions when looking at it.

It is obvious that the operations are not identical in terms of objective, concept, force employment, and using deadly weapons. The aim of the comparison is to analyze the background conditions with the failed operation. Furthermore, there is no failed peace support operation exactly like the Turkish one in Afghanistan. The failed U.S. Iraq operation seems more suitable than other operations in analyzing background conditions. A comparison chart was created considering these points.

**Table 1:** Comparing the Turkish Operation in Afghanistan With the U.S. Operation in Iraq

PSOs	Success Factors For Background Conditions of PSO							Grade
	Common Geography and History	Common Faith	Common Whishes	Legitimacy	Respect for Values	Not Having Imperial Motive	Availability of Sufficient Force	
Turkish PSO in Afghanistan (Success Case)	+	+	+	UNSC Resolution Dec 2001	+	-	+	6
The U.S. Iraq Occupation (Failed Case)	-	-	-	No UNSC Resolution	+	+	-	2

66 “Iraq War Facts, Results & Statistics at January 31, 2012”, *US Liberal Politics*, 4 March 2012, (<http://usliberals.about.com/od/homelandsecurit1/a/IraqNumbers.htm>).

67 “The Iraq War Will Cost Us \$3 Trillion, and Much More”, *Washington Post*, 9 March 2008, (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/07/AR2008030702846.html>).

## **Inferences from Turkey's Unique PSO in Afghanistan**

The main inference from the Turkish experiments is the presence of a unique Turkish model. In order to conceptualize it, the first step is modeling the Turkish approach in Afghanistan. For that purpose, a dynamic modeling system is developed through colorations and the links between basic determinants. The structure of the modeling is mapped (See Figure 1). Finally, the applicability of the model is examined for each type of peace support operation (see Table 2).

There are quite a lot of reasons that account for Turkey being a unique model in Afghanistan. These can be attributed to historical, economic, cultural, social, military, and other areas. Turkey's good relations with Afghanistan have stemmed from three distinct motives which were explained as having a common geography, faith, and wishes.

These commonalities and Turkish contribution to ISAF in a non-combatant manner constitutes legitimacy for the TAF's operations in Afghanistan and international presence as well.

While the other partners of ISAF conduct kinetic and non-kinetic operations as part of their mission, Turkey retains some "national caveats"<sup>68</sup> which prevent it from engaging in warlike activities, but help it concentrate on assistance to the Afghan people as a whole on the way to better development, security, and governance. The Turkish strategy in the peace support operation in Afghanistan is based upon five pillars: 1) being respected by the Afghans 2) confidence building, 3) using soft power rather than hard power, 4) adherence to international law using of force, and 5) assistance for rebuilding.

At first glance it may be speculated that Turkey is enjoying the "good cop" role. However, Turkey believes that the focus of the operation in Afghanistan should be securing the country through the ANSF while ISAF would help to promote governance and development. Turkey has militarily focused on building up a strong Afghan ANSF to cope with insurgents with its capacity. Thus, training the ANSF both in Turkey and Afghanistan has been initiated. The key to counter possible vulnerabilities caused by TAF caveats is the successful application of the TLSR process. Turkey's caveat regarding NATO operations has aimed at preserving Afghan people's trust, which evolved through many centuries. It is

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68 The term "National Caveat" refers a contributing nation's limitation or rejection on conducting some types of operations during its mission. In this context TAF in Afghanistan does not deal with, counter-terrorist, counter-narcotic and counter-mine operations.


misleading to allege that Turkey conducts a peace support operation while the other allies conduct a peace enforcement operation in a low-intensity war environment, which is quite problematic.

Besides its military contribution, Turkey's support to Afghanistan also covers non-military fields, such as diplomacy and international efforts, social, health, and other areas. As was discussed in the previous explanations, Turkey insistently followed a different approach from other nations' implementation methods in Afghanistan. Turkey has preferred to put into action the social, economic, health, construction, infrastructure, and educational policies in close coordination with its military strategy.

Turkey has become key player among Afghan people with its military and civilian capability as well as with its mediator role between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Turkey's policy associated with winning hearts and mind of people has the key answers for the chaotic circumstances in Afghanistan.

The unique Turkish status in Afghanistan can be summarized as respecting the national dignity and moral values of Afghan people, supporting the maintenance of a safe and secure environment through a non-kinetic military approach, and improving the ordinary people's lives with civilian capabilities. Considering all this, the Turkish contribution to Afghanistan can be considered an inherently unique model from a military perspective.

The structure of the Turkish model is shown on Figure 1. According to that, the structure follows a linear consistency of five elements: 1) legitimate power, 2) human-centric strategy, 3) non-combat means, 4) assistance to the host nation's process and 5) nation building objectives. The structure is coherent and stable with all the elements a model should have.



Feasibility of the model is analyzed in Table 2

**Table 2:** Feasibility of the Turkish Model for Peace Support Operations

Elements of the Model	Types of Peace Support Operations			
	Conflict Prevention	Peace Enforcement	Peacekeeping	Peace Building & Making
Legitimate power	+	+	++	+++
Human centric strategy	+	+	++	+++
Non-combat means	-	-	++	+++
Assistance to host nation's process	+	+	++	+++
Nation building objectives	-	-	+++	+++

As seen from the table, the Turkish experiment is suitable to a PSO in which the probability of the use of force is quite low. The applicability of the model proposed is high in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building operations. This model cannot be offered for conflict prevention and peace enforcement operations.

## **Conclusion**

Afghanistan is still the central issue from the perspective of policymakers, academic debates, and public concerns. Although NATO and the United States incurred heavy costs and casualties in Afghanistan so far, they are still searching for the right policy to apply. The final approach is based on the self-capable ANSF that is supposed to be taking over security responsibilities at end of 2014. Therefore, academic studies have focused on contributing literature with new thinking.

Considering all analyses, it can be summarized that Turkey is making a unique peacekeeping effort in Afghanistan. Turkey with its military and civilian capabilities, as well as with its mediator role between Afghanistan and Pakistan, has become one of the key players in the ISAF coalition. Turkey's policy associated with winning hearts and minds of people sets a unique example in the chaotic circumstances in Afghanistan that no other player has replicated to that extent. The U.S. also applied the strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. For ISAF, this has become the strategic priority. What is unique for Turkey may be being in a relatively better position faced with challenges regarding the application of this strategy.

Considering the difficulties in gauging the success in any peace support operation, we tried a different approach to measure Turkish peacekeeping efforts. So the success of the Turkish effort in Afghanistan was gauged on the basis of Turkey's contribution. The effect of this contribution was also observed in the field, assessed by in-depth interviews with Afghans, and daily debate with other peacekeepers.

All in all, Turkey's exclusive relations with Afghanistan have led Turkey to conduct a peculiar type of peace support operation which is quite different from the other PSOs carried out in many aspects. The Turkish method of operation in Afghanistan is based on respecting the national dignity and moral values of Afghan people, supporting the maintenance of a safe and secure environment through a non-kinetic military approach, and improving the ordinary people's lives with civilian capabilities. As a whole, the unique Turkish operation aims to employ soft power rather than hard power. Therefore, the Turkish contribution to Afghanistan can inherently be reckoned a unique model from a military perspective.

As expressed, Turkey's peacekeeping efforts have gained success in Afghanistan mainly because of background conditions. They are a common geography,

common faith, common wish, legitimacy of operation, not carrying imperial aims, availability of sufficient forces, and respecting values of Afghans.

The common geography brings the two nations to a line of communication with a shared history, culture, religion, values, etc. The common “destiny” is in two areas and takes into account what Afghans and Turks have created and what they were subjected to. The first is the formation of a national consciousness that enabled both nations to emerge as regional powers. Second, both nations had to be part of the power struggle among the global powers of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Turkey had to struggle with the Eastern Question while Afghanistan had to face the Great Game, both of which resulted from their geopolitical situations. The common wishes of the two nations were their sovereignty and prosperity through Western-style modernization.

In conclusion, the main inference from the Turkish experiment is that the Turkish model is a decent example of a PSO in which the probability of the use of force is quite low. The applicability of the model proposed is high in peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building operations. The model seems likely to face strong hindrances in conflict prevention and peace enforcement. Furthermore, in order to be successful in the Turkish-style model, there should be robust background conditions that facilitate the conduct of operations. Anyone interested in peacekeeping operation studies may apply these background conditions to any other successful or failed cases around the globe to explain their success or failure.

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